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Abstract This paper estimates the effect of environmental regulation on industry location
and compares it with other determinants of location such as agricultural, education and R&D
country characteristics. The analysis is based on a general empirical trade model that captures
the interaction between country and industry characteristics in determining industry location.
The Johnson–Neyman technique is used to fully explicate the nature of the conditional inter-
actions. The model is applied to data on 16 manufacturing industries from 13 European
countries. The empirical results indicate that the pollution haven effect is present and that
the relative strength of such an effect is of about the same magnitude as other determinants
of industry location. A significant negative effect on industry location is observed only at
relatively high levels of industry pollution intensity.
Keywords Pollution haven hypothesis · Comparative advantage · Industry location
1 Introduction
Does environmental regulation have a significant negative impact on industry location? This
question is at the heart of the trade and environment debate. A positive answer to this question
might give grounds to concerns regarding a host of interrelated issues: the emergence of ‘pol-
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lution havens’ in environmentally lax countries, harm to competitiveness in environmentally
strict countries, and a consequent attempt by jurisdictions to undercut each other’s environ-
mental standards. Such issues have served as an additional impediment to the conclusion of
the latest round of WTO trade liberalization that started in Seattle in 1999 (Ederington et al.
2004; Wolfe 2004). Industrialists in the EU are also worried about the extent to which the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme impairs their competitiveness (Reinaud 2004). Similarly in the
US, competitiveness concerns were raised during the debate on the impact of North American
Free Trade. Critics argued that differential environmental standards across Canada, Mexico
and US would result in massive capital flight to Mexico which would cause more overall
pollution.
These issues have received considerable attention in the academic literature and much of
the studies are collected under the denominator of the so-called Pollution Haven Hypothesis
(PHH).1 This hypothesis purports that changes in environmental regulation results in a relo-
cation of dirty goods production from countries with stringent environmental regulation to
those with lax environmental regulation. While the hypothesis is intuitively plausible, reviews
of the empirical literature have concluded that the evidence is mixed or that the correlation
between environmental regulation and industry performance is weak (see, for e.g., Copeland
and Taylor 2003; Jaffe et al. 1995; Raspiller and Riedinger 2008). Supported by evidence
from a meta-analysis of 11 studies, Jeppesen et al. (2002) show how empirical specifica-
tion, data issues, definition of the regulatory variable, and the control variables included all
have a considerable influence on the empirical results. In particular they find that the smaller
the geographical area of study, the larger the estimated influence of regulation. They also
find that the often reported results that pollution and non-pollution intensive industries are
affected similarly may be a repercussion of pooling industries that are in fact heterogeneous.
Taylor (2004) has further pointed out that empirical work on the PHH has been troubled
by, among other things, the fact that researchers at times mistake a pollution haven effect
for the pollution haven hypothesis. Pollution haven effects occur if differences in the levels
of environmental regulatory stringency affect the inter-jurisdictional distribution of pollut-
ing industries. Such effects, if present, are only one determinant of industry location. The
PHH however postulates that the interaction between environmental regulation and pollu-
tion intensity is the most important determinant for firm location, or at least more important
than other determinants, such as the availability of capital and skilled labor. This leads—it is
hypothesised—to a “race to the bottom”, where jurisdictions have incentives to lower environ-
mental standards to maintain or increase their share of those industries most affected by such
standards.
The differential stringency of environmental regulation is only one of several motives for
firms’ location choices and hence there have been recent calls in the literature for empiri-
cal work weighing the relative strength of these different motives2 (Taylor 2004). Our aim
is to present a way of undertaking such an assessment. The analysis in this paper comple-
ments those of Becker and Henderson (2001), Greenstone (2002), and List and McHone
(2000) who have documented evidence of the pollution haven effect using county level plant
data for the US and New York state, respectively. Becker and Henderson study four pollu-
tion intensive industries, Greenstone uses dummies for dirty as opposed to clean industries,
1 See, for example, a recent edited volume dedicated to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Fullerton 2006).
2 Such calls also remind us of a seemingly trivial but a more general point about hypothesis testing. Strictly
speaking, the question of how accurate a hypothesis is necessitates an explicit statement of an alternative
hypothesis with which the maintained hypothesis is to be compared. In the absence of an alternative hypoth-
esis, normal statistical methods of inference are not applicable and rejection/acceptance of the maintained
hypotheses is a matter of mere judgment (Leamer 1984, pp. 45–47).
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and List and McHone compare the location decisions of polluting new plants in attainment
(stringent) and non-attainment (lax) counties.3 We propose an alternative approach by explic-
itly including a continuous variable of pollution intensity per industries so that we can address
the question: ‘how polluting must an industry be to be adversely affected by environmental
regulation?’, a refinement of the typical question in the literature: ‘are polluting industries
affected by environmental regulation?’. Also, we include other determinants of firm location
so that we can compare the different determinants and distinguish between the pollution
haven hypothesis and the pollution haven effect. In this sense, this paper also complements
Levinson and Taylor’s (2008) study which, like this paper, uses a continuous measure of
pollution intensity as an explanatory variable but it does not compare environmental policy
with other location determinants. Our paper further complements the paper by Cole et al.
(2005) which analysed US’s revealed comparative advantage to examine the hypothesis of
a decline in US’s specialisation in pollution-intensive industries. The authors did not find a
support for the hypothesis and gave the explanation that such industries were also intensive
in physical and human capital which US is endowed with relatively well.4
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we integrate two strands
of literature; one from economic geography and one from environmental econom-
ics. We employ a general empirical trade model that has recently appeared in the
new economic geography literature but has not previously been used in the pollution
haven literature. The model analyzes the joint role of country and industry charac-
teristics in determining industry location. Specifically, it estimates how high and low
levels of country characteristics interact with high and low intensities of the corre-
sponding industry attributes in location decisions. The model allows us to supplement
and expand recent findings in the empirical PHH literature that the impact of envi-
ronmental regulation tends to be “heterogeneous both spatially and across industry”
(Millimet and List 2004. p. 261; Mulatu et al. 2004). The model complements the
analyses by Cole and Elliott (2003a) and Chintrakarn and Millimet (2006) as it uses
explicit variables for environmental policy and pollution intensity as a driver of loca-
tion, rather than studying the pollution haven effect indirectly by regressing emission lev-
els against trade intensity, income, the capital/labor ratio, and their various interaction
effects.
Second, we elaborate on the interpretation of the conditional effects associated with the
interactive terms in our empirical model. The most common method for probing interactive
effects is to test significance of coefficients at specific levels of the predictors. In our case, the
standard approach would be to test significance for location dependence on environmental
policy stringency, given a specific level of the industry’s pollution intensity. We, more broadly,
present the dependence relation over the whole range of industry’s pollution intensity and
employ the Johnson–Neyman technique to calculate regions of significance and confidence
bands for evaluating the conditional effects.
3 Our paper also complements papers in a related strand of the literature such as List and Co (2000); Keller
and Levinson (2002) and Xing and Kolstad (2002) who focus, respectively on US inbound and outbound FDI.
Each of these papers compares regression results for dirty and clean industries (or all manufacturing) and
obtains some evidence of the pollution haven effect.
4 Broadly speaking, our paper is also related to that of Cole and Elliott (2003b) which distinguishes between
two somewhat different questions examined, respectively in the Heckscher–Ohlin and in the ‘new’ trade mod-
els: does environmental regulation affect net exports of pollution-intensive goods?; and does environmental
regulation, like the traditional factor endowments, play a role in the composition of trade? Again, however,
the paper does not compare environmental policy with other location determinants.
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Third, as we apply our approach to data on manufacturing industries from European coun-
tries, the analysis focuses on intra-EU heterogeneity and its consequences for firm location.
The dataset includes pollution intensive industries such as Industrial Chemicals and ‘clean’
industries such as Radio, TV & Communication and covers countries with stringent envi-
ronmental regulation such as Finland and Sweden as well as countries with relatively lax
environmental regulation such as Greece and Belgium. A disadvantage of a narrow country
selection is lack of variability in country characteristics, which will make the empirical tests
harder to prove significance. On the other hand, an advantage of a narrow country sample
is that it reduces the possibilities of omitted variable bias, as these countries share much of
their history, geography, and many institutions. There is no need to suspect colonial history,
climate conditions, or large differences in cultural attitudes to affect the results. In general,
working with a homogeneous sample for an empirical study makes it hard to find significant
results, but if these are found, they are more reliable. In previous studies, it has been shown
that environmental policy within the EU is not homogeneous: within the EU-15 substantial
differences exist (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006a). Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that
for countries in the EU-15, still more than half of manufacturing imports and exports remains
within this group of countries, so that policy’s effects on industry location is of substantial
importance.5
The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be uncovered, and that the relative
strength of such an effect is of about the same magnitude as other determinants of industry
location. Further investigation of the conditional effects indicates that a significant negative
effect on industry location is observed only at relatively high levels of pollution intensity.
Thus, the focus on environmental stringency in this literature is only half the story: both strin-
gency of environmental regulation and industry pollution intensity matter. The findings we
report suggest that for the PHH literature the interaction between the differential stringency
of environmental regulation and differences in industry pollution intensity is an essential
element.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Empirical Model
The model aims to investigate the relevance of various factors in industry’s location. In par-
ticular, we want to know why some countries attract a high share of certain industries, while
other countries have a much lower share. Formally, we search for the determinants of the
share of country i in the total manufacturing production of industry k, that is si,k defined as
sik = zi,k/∑i ′ zi ′,k , where zi,k measures the size of industry k in country i , and the country
label with prime (i ′) is used to sum over all countries.
Trade theorists’ discussions of industry location are informed by two strands of literature.
Comparative advantage arguments based on the role of factor endowments can be derived
from Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) models. Recent theoretic work has extended the standard HO
models to accommodate environmental factors where cross-country differences in the strin-
gency of environmental regulation play a role in trade patterns. (e.g. Antweiler et al. 2001;
Copeland and Taylor 1994, 1995, 2003).
5 We notice also that much of previous literature has studied competition between US states, and between US
and Canada.
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New economic geography (NEG), by contrast, stresses the importance of increasing
returns, market access and upstream and downstream linkages. NEG predicts that while
activity will be dispersed when transport costs are either ‘very high’ or ‘very low’, cluster-
ing of industries occur when transport costs are ‘intermediate’.6 The HO and NEG theories
should be regarded as complementary and their relative importance for industrial location
outcomes is thus an empirical issue.
Recently, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000b) developed an empirical model for the loca-
tion of European industry that incorporates both types of effects, i.e. comparative advan-
tage and market access. They estimate a model that takes account of the HO arguments
by relating the factor intensities of industries to the factor endowments of countries. The
NEG story is captured by examining how the share of intermediates in costs, the share of
sales to industrial users, and scale economies interact with market potential in determining
location.
We extend Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000b) econometric model and include environmen-
tal factors. Countries are heterogeneous in various characteristics such as endowments of
natural resources and skilled labor, and proximity to markets. We add to these country char-
acteristics the relative stringency of environmental regulation. Similarly, industries differ in
their various attributes such as the intensity of use of production factors like skilled labor,
and their reliance on intermediate inputs. We add to these attributes the pollution intensity
of the industry. In equilibrium we expect that industries that highly value a regional char-
acteristic locate there. All else equal, a technology intensive industry will locate in a region
with abundant skilled labor, while pollution intensive industries will be attracted to coun-
tries with a relatively lax environmental regulation. In the context of the PHH literature, the
relevant empirical question is how strong the interaction is between environmental regula-
tion and pollution intensity, relative to the interaction between other country and industry
characteristics.
Central in the model are the potential interaction channels, indexed j . For each interaction
channel, we have a vector of associated country characteristics x j , and a vector of associ-
ated industry attributes y j . For the skilled-labor interaction channel, x j measures countries’
skilled labor abundance, while y j measures the industries’ skilled labor intensity. For the
pollution interaction channel, x j measures the countries’ stringency of environmental reg-
ulation (or its inverse, the laxity), while y j measures the industries’ pollution intensity. For
each interaction channel, there is a neutral country characteristic level χ j , also referred to
as a cut off point, such that a country with this characteristic does not specifically attract
industries with high or low levels for the associated industry attribute. Similarly, there is a
neutral industry attribute level γ j , or cut off point, such that an industry with this attribute
level does not consider the associated country-characteristic in the selection of its location.
Using these parameters, Midelfart–Knarvik et al.’s model can be written as a reduced form
equation:
ln(si,k) = c + α ln(popi ) +
∑
j
β j (x ji − χ j )(y jk − γ j ) + εi,k, (1)
where popi is the population living in country i, α is a scale coefficient, and β j measures the
strength of interaction effect j . The country characteristics and industry attributes are chosen
such that the interaction coefficients β j are expected to be positive. Expanding the equation
we obtain the estimating equation as follows:
6 See, e.g., Krugman and Venables (1995).
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ln(si,k) = c′ + α ln(popi ) +
∑
j
(β j x ji y
j
k − γ ′ j x ji − χ ′ j y jk ) + εi,k, (2)
where γ ′ j = β jγ j , χ ′ j = β jχ j , and c′ = c + ∑ j β jχ jγ j . After we have estimated β, χ ′,
and γ ′ from (2) we can inverse the procedure and calculate the parameters χ and γ in (1).7
We specify seven interaction channels. The first three interaction channels are associated
with the traditional HO trade model.8 The fourth interaction channel is the environmental
variable which is the main concern in this paper. The last three interaction channels rep-
resent the NEG concerns of the model, namely the pull of centrality interacting with scale
economies, and forward and backward linkages. In full, the interaction channels are: (i)
Agricultural production as percentage of GDP times industry agricultural input intensity;9
(ii) Secondary & higher education as percentage population times industry skilled labor inten-
sity; (iii) Researchers & Scientists as percentage of labor force times industry R&D intensity;
(iv) Environmental standard laxity times industry pollution intensity; (v) Market potential
times industry intermediate input use; (vi) Market potential times industry sale to industry;
and finally (vii) Market potential times industry average plant size. The main hypothesis
regarding the new economic geography interaction variables is that a firm’s location decision
involves consideration of market access alongside production costs.10 In Table 1 we present
the country characteristics and their association with the interaction channels, and the data
sources. In Table 2, we present the industry attributes and their association with the interaction
channels.
3 Interactions and Regions of Significance
Of key interest for the PHH debate is the effect of a country’s characteristic on firm location.
The question is whether a change in environmental policy, or in another country’s character-
istic, will make this country more or less attractive to firms, in general, or for specific sectors.
From the location model as in Eq. (1), we can directly calculate the change in an industry’s





= β j (y jk − γ j ) = β j y jk − γ ′ j . (3)
Given a positive interaction coefficient β j , it is immediately clear from Eq. (3) that the
increase of characteristic j in a country increases the share of industry k if that industry’s
level of attribute j exceeds the attribute’s cut-off level, that is, if y jk > γ j . An increase of a
country’s characteristic j will repel other industries. For example, countries with lax environ-
mental policies may attract pollution-intensive industries and repel clean industries, or stated
the other way around, countries with strict environmental policies may attract clean indus-
tries and repel pollution-intensive industries. What is considered a clean or a dirty industry
is determined by the cut-off value γ j . An immediately obvious comparison of interest there-
fore is that between the industry’s cut-off points γ j and the mean, maximum, and minimum
7 When different interaction effects make use of the same country characteristic or industry attribute, the
calculation of the cut-off points χ and γ becomes slightly more complicated. See notes to Table 3.
8 Capital is ignored because of the assumption of capital mobility across Europe.
9 Following Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000b) the rationale for taking the variable Agricultural production as %
GDP instead of the underlying conventional factor inputs such as land is that, since our concern is the pattern
of manufacturing, agriculture can be considered as an exogenous measure of the ‘endowment of agriculture’.
10 See, e.g., Venables (1996).
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values of these industry attributes reported in Table 2. If an industry attribute’s cut-off point
is close to the minimum value of that industry attribute, this means that an increase in the
corresponding country characteristic will attract industry activity, for the sample of indus-
tries as a whole. If an attribute’s cut-off point is close to the maximum value of that industry
attribute, this means that an increase in the corresponding country characteristic will repel
industry activity, for the sample of industries as a whole. If the cut-off point is in between,
an increase in the associated country characteristic implies a more selective firm activity, but
not necessarily an overall increase or decrease.
We notice that the country characteristics cut-off levels χ j do not appear in the analysis
of firm location’s response to a change in country characteristics (Eq. 3), and thus we will
not further discuss them.
The expression in (3) also reveals that the marginal effect of a change in a country char-
acteristic j on the share of an industry located within it is proportional to the interaction
coefficient β j , and the difference between the industry’s attribute level y jk and the cut-off
point γ j . Estimation of β j and γ j therefore permits these marginal effects to be estimated.
Substitution of the estimated coefficients βˆ j and γˆ ′ j gives, for any given industry attribute
levely jk , the variance of the estimated marginal effect in (3):
var[βˆ j (y jk − γˆ j )] = (y jk )2var[βˆ j ] + var[γˆ ′ j ] − 2y jk cov[βˆ j , γˆ ′ j ]. (4)
Thus, estimation of βˆ j and γˆ ′ j allows us to plot the marginal effect and associated confi-
dence interval of environmental policy on industry location, as dependent on the industry’s
pollution intensity. This approach of calculating regions of significance and confidence bands
for evaluating conditional effects is known as the Johnson–Neyman (J–N) technique (Huitema
1980). Clearly the J–N technique has advantages over the more common approach which
would involve testing the conditional effects at designated levels of environmental stringency
(e.g., high, medium, or low (Bauer and Curran 2005)).
Although the focus here is environmental (pollution intensity and the stringency of envi-
ronmental regulation) the procedure and insights are general. For example, one could estimate
the marginal effect of changes in a nation’s level of skilled labour on its share of skill-intensive
industries.
4 Data
We base our analysis on a one-period cross-country cross-industry sample. The sample
includes 13 countries and 16 industries. The choice of the period (average of 1990–1994) was
dictated by availability of most of the explanatory variables.11 Descriptions of the variables
and data sources are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The discussion here is limited to some
relevant issues not contained in the table and a further description of the main variables of
interest in this paper, i.e. the environmental variables. Data on each of the country char-
acteristics pertain to around the year 1990 and are obtained from Midelfart-Knarvik et al.
(2000b). Input–output data (i.e. agricultural intensity, intermediate input intensity and indus-
try sale) are constructed as (output) weighted averages of the data for Denmark, Germany,
France and the UK for 1990. The environmental standard laxity variable is constructed as one
minus the Environmental Sustainability Index (scaled to [0, 1]) which is constructed jointly
by World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and Center for
11 We have also experimented with each of the five individual year values for the left hand side variable. The
results are fairly similar.
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Table 3 Regression results
Dependent variable: ln(sik ) Model
I II III IV
Size variable
Population 1.04∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
Interaction channels (β j )
Agricultural abundance × intensity 31.44∗ 32.10∗ 35.16∗∗ 35.22∗∗
Skilled labor abundance × intensity 1.83 1.81 1.97 1.96
R&D abundance × intensity 4.04∗∗ 4.18∗∗ 4.66∗∗ 4.78∗∗
Environmental laxity × poll. Intensity 1.21∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 1.20∗∗ 0.41∗∗
Market potential × Sales to industry −5.60 −5.67
Market potential × Intermediate input use −4.52 −4.18
Market potential × Plant size 0.17 0.16
Country characteristics cut-off points (χ j )
Agricultural abundance −0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.004
Skilled labor abundance 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.80
R&D abundance 0.16 0.15 0.45 0.49
Environmental standards laxity 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.26
Market potential 0.19 0.19
0.07 0.09
0.17 0.20
Industry attributes cut-off points (γ j )
Agricultural input intensity 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.41
Skilled labor intensity 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04
R&D intensity 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Pollution intensity 0.87 2.08 0.86 2.04
Sales to industrya 0.41 0.41
Intermediate input usea 0.41 0.41
Plant sizea 4.09 4.09
N 208 208 208 208
Adj. R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
a The fifth, sixth and seventh interaction effects all use the same country characteristic Market Potential. As a
result, in Eq. (2), x5 = x6 = x7, consequently we cannot estimate γ ′5 separately from γ ′6 and γ ′7to identify
the cut off points. Since the first two associated industry attributes (sales, intermediate input use) are of about
the same size, while the third attribute (plant size) is about ten times larger (Table 2), we impose γ 5 = γ 6 and
γ 7 = 10 · γ 5, and this condition enables us to identify the cut off points
International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University. This index refers to
the year 2001 and is based on a total of 67 underlying variables (such as environmental regu-
latory stringency, environmental regulatory innovation and number of EIA guidelines).12,13
12 This index is also used in Javorcik and Wei (2004).
13 We have also experimented with an alternative measure of environmental regulation stringency from the
Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2002, published by the World Economic Forum. The main results using
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The time frame of the environmental sustainability index raises the issue of endogeneity,
as nations’ environmental policy might be driven by the industries located within them. It
can be argued that environmental policy is unlikely to vary dramatically annually, or at least
the ranking across the sample, in the time period considered here. However, to check for an
endogeneity problem, we carry out a robustness analysis where we use corruption in 1995,
income in 1992, urbanization in 1997, and schooling in 1990 as instruments (based on Pel-
legrini and Gerlagh 2006a). The results are reported in Table 11 and fully confirm the results
of the base analysis. We do not use the instruments for the main analyses in this paper, as
this would make our discussion of the implications of real versus possible counterfactual
environmental policies unnecessarily opaque.
We use two alternative measures of pollution intensity. The first measure is taken from
Low and Yeats (1992) who provide estimates of pollution abatement and control costs as a
share of the value of industry output in the USA for the year 1988. The second measure is
based on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data compiled by the US Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. The TRI data catalogues releases of various types of emissions into air, water,
land and underground for each manufacturing industry group in the US. Such emissions
measured by weight for the year 1990–1995 are averaged and normalized by the value of
industry shipments for the year 1992.14 The full data on all the explanatory variables are
reported in the appendix in Tables 7 and 8.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 3 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Robust Error estimation of Eq. (1)
for four different specifications. Models I and II use the full model with the NEG and HO
interaction channels, with two different specifications for the industry pollution intensity
attribute. Models III and IV use only the first four HO variables, again with alternative mea-
sures of the industry pollution intensity attribute. Models I and III use abatement costs, and
Models II and IV use industry emissions, as the measure of pollution intensity.
For all models, the estimated coefficients for the interaction channels β reported in Table 3
are expected to have positive signs. The estimations confirm the expectations for the HO chan-
nels. Thus, industries with large inputs from agriculture tend to locate in countries with a
Footnote 13 continued
this measure of stringency are reported in the Appendix (Table 9 being the equivalent of Table 3 and Table 10 the
equivalent of Table 5). These results confirm our finding of significant positive coefficients for the interaction
channel (with the two alternative pollution intensity variables discussed below) but gave a wider uncertainty
interval for the marginal effects per industry as in Eq. (4). We have further considered other measures of
stringency. One measure is reported in van Soest et al. (2006). This measure is based on the shadow price of
energy and is calculated for two sectors: one for primary metals sector and another for food and beverages. The
coefficient of correlation between each of these two and our measure, ESI are, respectively, −0.26 and 0.41.
Whatever the merit of these two indicators of stringency, they are available for only 9 out of the 13 countries
in our sample. There are four more indicators that appeared in the literature and as argued by van Soest et al.
(2006) each has shortcomings as a measure of stringency. A practical problem is that most of them are only
available for a subset of our countries. Nonetheless each is positively correlated with our measure, ESI.
14 Our second measure of pollution intensity is also used in Javorcik and Wei (2004). These authors also
employ an alternative measure of pollution intensity similar to our first measure, i.e. based on pollution
abatement expenditure. A third measure that we considered is based on Greenhouse Gas Emissions in UK
manufacturing industries (available from UK Environmental Accounts). We normalised this data for 1990 by
the value of output of the respective industry in order to proxy intensity. The resulting measure is positively
correlated with our two measures (correlation coefficients of 0.57 and 0.34, respectively). However, we did
not pursue this alternative measure because, unlike the other two measures, it is based on GHG emissions
only.
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large agricultural industries, industries with above-average valued labor input tend to locate in
countries with an above-average skilled population, R&D intensive industries tend to locate
in R&D rich countries, and indeed, industries that are relatively more pollution intensive
(such as Industrial Chemicals and Drugs & Medicines) are attracted to countries which have
relatively lax environmental standards. We note that although the β coefficient for skilled
labour is not significant in Table 3, we show later that the level of skilled labour supply has
a significant positive effect on the share of the most skilled-labor intensive industry (see
Table 5).
The additional three NEG variables, however, do not all have the expected sign and are
insignificant. A formal test of comparing the full model with the model of only the HO vari-
ables (including the environmental variable) amounts to a test of whether the estimates of the
coefficients of the NEG variables are jointly zero. If so, the parsimonious model is preferred.
The F statistic (F[7, 187]) for the hypothesis of an HO model is 1.62 for Model I and 1.81
for Model II which, given a critical value at the 5% significance level of 2.01, indicates that
the null hypothesis that the HO model is appropriate cannot be rejected. We therefore omit
the NEG variables and confine further analysis to Models III and IV. By comparing models
I with III and II with IV, we see that the strength of the pollution interaction effect is robust
with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of the NEG channels. For all other interaction
effects, we also find robust results. This insignificance of the NEG variables contrasts with
the finding of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000a) who report significant estimates for the market
potential variable but their findings do not seem to be particularly robust as can be seen from
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000a).
Using Eq. (3), a comparison of the industry’s cut-off points with the mean value informs
us on the effect of the country characteristic on the average industry within our sample.
The first remarkable finding is that the cut-off point for agricultural intensity is above the
maximum attribute level observed in the sample. Thus, as Eq. (3) predicts, for all industries
within the sample, the industry share in a country decreases as agriculture’s contribution to
that country’s GDP increases. For the food processing industry (the most intensive industry),
the decrease is relatively modest, whereas for the non-ferrous metal industry (the least agri-
culture-intensive industry), the effect is very large. An explanation for this finding is that, in
general, manufacturing and agriculture are strongly negatively correlated. For all other factor
inputs, the cut-off point is between the minimum and maximum industry attribute level, sig-
nifying that more intensive industries are attracted by the more resource abundant countries,
while less intensive industries typically locate in countries that are less resource abundant for
that specific resource. For skilled labor, the cut-off point (1.04) is below the industry’s attri-
bute’s mean (1.08), which means that within our sample, on average, industries are attracted
by countries with higher levels of skilled labor. Regarding R&D intensity, the cut-off point
(0.04) is also below the mean (0.087) so that, on average, firms are attracted by R&D-rich
countries. For both measures of pollution intensity, the cut-off points (0.86 and 2.04) are
above the sample means (0.73 and 1.67) meaning that, on average, firms are not attracted
by lax environmental policies, or stated inversely, are not deterred by stricter environmental
policy. This result is a first indication that strict environmental policy does not deter manu-
facturing industries in general. That is, even though the most pollution-intensive industries
show a significant smaller share in countries with strict environmental policies, on average,
within our sample, industries do not prefer to locate in countries with lax environmental
policies.
The coefficients reported in Table 3 do not allow one to assess the relative importance
of the various interaction channels. To allow such an assessment of the relative importance
of the various interaction effects, the estimated cut-off points from Eq. (2), as presented in
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Table 4 Standardized
coefficients of interaction effects




Agricultural abundance × intensity 0.298∗ 0.298∗
Skilled labor abundance × intensity 0.096 0.077
R&D abundance × intensity 0.071∗∗ 0.072∗∗
Environmental laxity × poll. intensity 0.096∗∗ 0.103∗∗
Table 5 Marginal effects of country characteristics evaluated for the most intensive industries
Model
III IV III′ IV′
Agricultural abundance −6.365∗∗ −6.351∗∗ −0.131∗∗ −0.131∗∗
Skilled labor abundance 1.912∗ 1.909∗ 0.097∗ 0.097∗
R&D abundance 1.470∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
Environmental stand. laxity 1.565∗∗ 1.408∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.099∗∗
Notes: Columns (III′) and (IV′) present coefficients for normalized dependent and independent variables with
unit SD
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
Table 3, are substituted in (1) and the dependent variable and independent variables are nor-
malized. Expressed in this manner, the estimated coefficients are standardized and hence are
comparable. In other words, we are measuring here the effects on the dependant variable in
terms of standard deviation units. The resulting standardized coefficients (which Wooldridge
2009, p.188 refers to as “beta-coefficients”) are independent of the scaling of the regressors
and are reported in Table 4. That is, the choice for the unit of measurement for the country
characteristics and industry attributes does not affect the coefficients reported in Table 4, and
thereby the explanatory variables are put on equal footing.
Considering the standardized coefficients reported in Table 4, we note that the agricul-
ture interaction remains the single largest determinant for industry location. The interac-
tion between environmental policy and pollution intensity is of next greatest magnitude
but is, in size, not much larger than the skilled labour and R&D interaction effects. The
relative importance of the four interaction channels is robust across the four model spec-
ifications (although only standardized coefficients from Models III and IV are reported
here).
The coefficients reported in Table 4 provide a general measure of the relative importance
of the various interaction effects but we are also interested in the more specific strength of
the interaction effects for the most intensive industries, that is, we may ask how strongly
an abundance of skilled labor attracts the most skill-intensive industries, compared to how
strongly a lax environmental policy attracts the most pollution intensive industries. For this,
we use Eq. (3). We recall that the marginal effect on the industry share of a change in the coun-
try characteristic j is proportional to the interaction coefficient β j as presented in Tables 3
and 4, and to the distance between the industry’s attribute level y jk and the cut-off point
γ j . Thus, for industries above the cut-off point, an increase in the country characteristic
will increase the industry share, while for industries below the cut-off point, an increase in
the country characteristic will decrease the share. Table 5 presents the marginal effects of
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country characteristics on location for the most resource-intensive industries, that is, Eq. (3)
evaluated at the maximum industry attribute level. We only report the HO interaction mod-
els (III and IV). For these models, we find that all four country characteristics are signif-
icant determinants for location of the most intensive industries, including skilled labour
abundance.
Agricultural abundance does not have the expected positive effect on the location of
the food processing industry. The sign is negative because the cut-off point is above the
maximum attribute level observed in the sample, as discussed above. The magnitude of the
three other country characteristic marginal effects appear similar in Columns (III) and (IV),
but for a proper comparison, in Columns (III′) and (IV′), we report the marginal effects
using the standardized independent and dependent variables. Thus, it can be seen that in
Models III and IV, a one standard deviation increase in the skilled labor supply increases
the share of the most skilled-labor intensive industry (drugs and medicines) by about 0.1
times the standard deviation. The scale of the environmental policy effect for the dirtiest
industry (industrial chemicals) is similar to this skilled labour effect, but the responsiveness
of R&D intensive industries to a one standard deviation change of R&D abundance is far
greater.
Figure 1 portrays in more detail the importance of a country’s environmental policy on its
share of particular industries.15 It is based on Eqs. (3) and (4) and uses results from Model
III. It shows the marginal effect of environmental policy on the production share condi-
tioned on the pollution intensity of the industry, with a 90% confidence interval added.
The upward slope of the solid line represents the marginal effect of environmental standard
laxity for different levels of pollution intensity, as depicted by Eq. (3). The figure shows
the cut-off point 0.86, where the solid line crosses the x-axis. For this level of pollution
intensity, environmental laxity has no effect on location. For the industries to the left of
this point a more stringent environmental policy increases the industry share.16 To the right
of this point a more environmentally lax policy may attract a higher industry share. The
90% confidence intervals around the line permit us to evaluate at which values of pollution
intensity environmental standard laxity has a statistically significant impact on production
shares.
A lax environmental policy has a statistically significant positive effect on industry share
when the pollution intensity level is above 1.86, above which there is only one pollution inten-
sive industry in our sample. On the right side of the figure, we find the pollution intensive
industries such as Industrial Chemicals, (with the highest intensity, labelled ‘H’). On the left
side of the figure, we find the majority of the industries that are less pollution intensive (the
average and median value of pollution intensity are shown as ‘A’ and ‘M’, respectively). The
‘cleanest’ industry with the lowest pollution intensity level (Radio, TV and Communication
Equipment) is shown by the point labelled ‘L’.
The graph indicates that while the pollution haven effect is present its negative effect
on industry location is significant only at relatively high levels of pollution intensity. At
15 This figure was constructed using the web-based tool of Preacher et al. (2003) (http://www.people.ku.edu/
~preacher/interact/mlr2.htm), see also Brambor et al. (2006).
16 Though in this specific case, there are no industries where strict environmental policy has a significantly
positive effect on their share, the model does not rule out this possibility. A possible explanation for such
a positive relationship is that countries with strict environmental policies also have high levels of attractive
characteristics such as good governance or low corruption levels, see Mulatu et al. (2004), Pellegrini and
Gerlagh (2006b).
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Fig. 1 The marginal effect of environmental standard laxity on production shares
Table 6 Actual, predicted and counterfactual production shares





















2.9 1.8 4.1 7.3
4. Least abundant
country
4.8 1.3 0.5 0.8
Counterfactual shares when countries would swap abundance values (%)
5. Most abundant
country
5.2 1.2 1.7 3.1
6. Least abundant
country
2.7 1.9 1.1 2.0
% point difference between predicted and counterfactual shares
(3)–(5) −2.3 0.6 2.4 4.2
(6)–(4) −2.1 0.6 0.6 1.2
Note: Estimates are based on the regression with pollution intensity variable 1
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moderate levels of pollution intensity, the influence of environmental standard would be
small compared to other forces, and at low levels of pollution intensity, strict environmental
standards are not a deterrent at all.
Finally, in Table 6 we compare our estimated industry shares with observed shares and
we calculate counterfactual industry shares: predicted shares if country characteristics (e.g.
environmental policy) changed. We do this first by comparing estimated and actual indus-
try shares for the most intensive industries in terms of each of agriculture, skills, R&D and
pollution intensity. In each case we compare these actual and predicted shares for the most
and least abundant countries in the respective input. We then simulate these shares if, in each
case, the most abundant country would become least abundant, and vice versa.
The comparison of the predicted and actual shares gives an idea of the fit of the model.
A comparison of the counterfactual with the predicted shares answers the question how
important the specific country characteristic is in determining the industry share. If the most
abundant country in a particular factor were to have the level of endowment of the least
abundant country what would be its share of production? The reverse also holds for the case
of the least abundant country. With respect to the environmental factor input, we find that
the model predicts a share of 7.3% of the most pollution intensive industry’s production
(Industrial chemicals) in the country with the most lax environmental standard (Belgium),
compared with an actual share of 4.8%. The model predicts a share of only 0.8% in the most
environmentally stringent country (Finland) while the actual figure is 1.0%.
If Belgium were to adopt the most stringent environmental regulation from Finland, the
model predicts a decline of the share by more than half, that is, 4.2% point. If Finland were to
copy the lax standards of Belgium, it would see its share increase by more than a factor two,
that is, 1.2% point. A change in R&D country characteristics has a similar effect in the sense
that if Sweden would decrease its number of researchers per thousand to the level of Greece,
its share of the Communication equipment industry is predicted to halve, while if Greece
could copy Sweden’s research abundance, it would see its share double. As both countries
are fairly small, in absolute terms the change in industry shares would be less compared to
the environmental policy change. A change in the abundance of skilled labor has somewhat
less substantial consequences.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper is an empirical analysis of the extent to which environmental regulation influences
industry location in Europe vis-à-vis other location determinants, mainly the traditional HO
factor endowment forces.
The analysis is based on a general empirical trade model. It has a distinctive feature in that
it models the theoretically-emphasized joint role of country and industry characteristics in
determining industry location. The model is applied to data on 16 manufacturing industries
from 13 European countries. The Johnson–Neyman technique is used to address the inter-
active terms in the empirical model and to calculate regions of significance and confidence
bands for evaluating the conditional effects.
This dataset covers countries with stringent environmental regulation like Finland and
Sweden, and countries with relatively lax environmental regulation such as Greece and Bel-
gium. With respect to industries, the dataset includes the most pollution intensive industries
such as Industrial Chemicals as well as relatively clean industries such as Radio, TV &
Communication Equipment.
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The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be uncovered, and the relative mag-
nitude of this effect is about the same as that of other determinants of industry location. This
might be interpreted as finding the pollution haven effect but failing to support the pollution
haven hypothesis.
Specifically, we find in our sample that whereas an increase in the skilled labour supply
increases the share of an industry with mean levels of characteristics, in contrast, increased
environmental regulatory laxity does not result in an increased share of the ‘average’ industry.
However, when the most polluting, rather than the average, industry is considered, increased
environmental regulatory laxity does result in a higher proportion of this dirty industry locat-
ing there. The approach presented could be developed in a number of ways in future research,
for example the issue of endogeneity of environmental policy in this framework, and the use
of panel data for more robust estimation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix
See Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.


























Austria 2.1 3.2 75.1 34 12303 67.9
Belgium 2.7 1.9 60.6 53 13264 44.1
Denmark 1.4 4.5 82.1 58 6627.8 67
Finland 1.4 6.6 72.6 67 3642.1 80.5
France 15.9 3.5 62.7 60 12380 65.8
Germany 21.9 3 82.1 59 13073 64.2
Greece 2.8 12.5 49.3 20 2335.7 53.1
Italy 15.5 4.1 41.4 32 8715.1 54.3
Netherlands 4.1 4 65.9 46 12840 66
Portugal 2.7 7.3 23.8 31 3193.8 61.4
Spain 10.6 5.4 35.1 32 4993.2 59.5
Sweden 2.4 3.4 76.7 78 5810.5 77.1
UK 15.7 2 55.3 50 12226 64.1
Notes: Definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 1
aEnvironmental standard laxity is therefore the inverse of these figures
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Table 9 Regression results of the determinants of industry location (with the stringency measure from Global
Competitiveness Report 2001–2002)
Dependent variable: ln(sik ) Model
I II III IV
Size variable
Population 1.06∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
Interaction channels (β j )
Agricultural abundance × intensity 34.48∗∗∗ 34.49∗∗∗ 41.56∗∗∗ 43.17∗∗∗
Skilled labor abundance × intensity 2.92∗∗ 2.88∗∗ 3.25∗∗ 3.09∗∗
R&D abundance × intensity 3.23∗ 3.41∗ 3.60∗ 3.94∗∗
Environmental laxity × poll. intensity 1.98∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 2.15∗∗ 0.67∗∗
Market potential × sales to industry −3.29 −2.96
Market potential × intermediate input use −4.96 −6.14∗
Market potential × plant size 0.23∗ 0.27∗∗
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
Table 10 Marginal effects of country characteristics evaluated for the most intensive industries (with the
stringency measure from Global Competitiveness Report 2001–2002)
Model
III IV
Agricultural abundance −1.89 −1.54
Skilled labor abundance 2.41∗ 2.26∗
R&D abundance 1.20∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
Environmental stand. laxity 0.99 0.44
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
Table 11 Interaction effects using instruments
Dependent variable: ln(sik ) Model
III IV III IV
Size variable
Population 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
Interaction channels ( β j )
Agricultural abundance × intensity 37.7∗∗∗ 38.4∗∗∗ 42.6∗∗∗ 44.1∗∗∗
Skilled labor abundance × intensity 2.45∗ 2.32∗ 3.11∗∗ 2.92∗∗
R&D abundance × intensity 4.26∗∗ 4.53∗∗ 3.70∗ 4.05∗∗
Environmental laxity × poll. intensity 2.03∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 2.09∗∗ 0.64∗∗
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Table 11 continued
Dependent variable: ln(sik ) Model
III IV III IV
Instruments (only instruments with
significant coefficients are used)
Corruption (1995)∗∗∗ Corruption (1995)∗∗∗
Urbanization (1997)∗∗ Income (1992)∗∗∗
Schooling (1990)∗∗
R2 adj first-stage 50% 94%
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1%
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